controversy, concerning judicial review by unaccountable arbitrators of governmental acts, has been no less vivid. 10 On the forefront of the debate have been disputes pitting reputedly bona fide regulatory activities for environmental purposes by governments against transnational companies as well as the legal consequences of claims raised by (mainly) American investors in connection with the emergency measures Argentina took during its economic crisis in 2001-02. 11 Recently, a statement by 31 academics -with expertise relating to investment law, arbitration, and regulation‖ recommended inter alia that states should review their existing investment treaties and that the -international business community should refrain from promoting the international investment regime and from resorting to investment treaty arbitration‖.
12
Adjudicators might respond to such criticism in many different ways, 13 e.g by way of adopting interpretative strategies better fitted for the purpose. Still, the best bet seems to be to minimize the likelihood of such criticism appearing in the first place. In that sense, proportionality analysis might serve courts and tribunals as a tactical maneuver with powerful strategic capabilities.
Correspondingly, adjudicators worldwide have employed such analysis more and more often over the last sixty years.
14 International judges and arbitrators, too, have embraced the technique and it is now a common feature of almost any international dispute settlement mechanism. 15 Investment treaty tribunals have recently begun conducting some forms of proportionality analysis as well, though, in my view with mixed success so far. Although an element of balancing can be found in several awards in discussions of standards that prohibit unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures, 16 or that require fair and equitable treatment, 17 in this paper I focus on explicit proportionality reasoning by tribunals, which is usually accompanied by the citation of jurisprudence from international adjudicators external to the investment treaty regime. It is suggested that the emergence of these types of proportionality analysis should be seen in light of the putative -legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration‖. 18 While much has been written about legitimacy in investment treaty arbitration, 19 surprisingly few scholars have looked into tribunals' use of proportionality analysis. 20 As far as the present author is aware the cases discussed in some depth below have not been examined together for these purposes. As such, this paper serves as a -prolegomenon‖ to a study of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration. Its chief claim to importance lies in the strengthening of ideas related to the relationship between the legitimacy of judicial review and modalities of legal reasoning, applied to the setting of a maturing international legal regime. This paper, which is part of a larger study of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration, continues in the following manner. Part 2 introduces the idea of legitimacy in international adjudication and explains why it is a crucial quality of the system through which states regulate their interaction with each other and with the other actors at the international level. Then, in Part 3, follows a brief examination of proportionality analysis, before I analyze and criticize its application by treaty tribunals in the most prominent cases so far in Part 4. The final Part sums up the argument and concludes that whereas there is little reason to believe in anything but continued usage of proportionality analysis it is uncertain whether the paths taken by treaty tribunals here explored are likely to be taken again.
Institutional and procedural legitimacy in investment treaty arbitration
-When it comes to legitimacy,‖ Laurence Tribe a few years back concluded that all has already been said, -and what has been said is all so deeply riddled with problems that it seems hardly worth restating, much less refuting or refining.‖ 21 That does not seem to be the case in international legal writing, although the description of a -veritable renaissance of international legitimacy talk over the past decade‖ might be accurate if international relations scholars and political scientists are included. 22 From a conventional international law perspective, it is presumably safe to conclude that State consent is the ultimate source of legitimacy for any international adjudicative body, although it certainly is not the only one.
At the establishment stage of any international regime, 24 as well as when non-participating states consider joining it, other sources of legitimacy, such as widespread participation and a just purpose, come into play. Consequently, if governments are to be convinced of as giving their consent to regulatory regimes, the perception of legitimacy is also an essential precondition for consent. 25 Legitimacy is therefore vital to any effective treaty regime, but it can be lost. If a treaty regime, such as that of investment treaty arbitration, 26 systematically provides consequences contrary to expectations of fairness among the stakeholders-for example if important environmental concerns are always or almost always trumped by the interests of foreign investors in the decisions of arbitral tribunals, or even if there is a perception that this is the case-the long-term consequence can prove harmful to the legitimacy of the treaty regime. 27 As a corollary, the legitimacy of the regime is requisite for ensuring the actors' compliance with it and even the prevention of denunciation. 28 This notion of exit from a treaty regime, furthermore, is in itself related to legitimacy because ‗[t]he higher the number of exiting states, the greater the damage to the system's credibility and viability.' 29 With this in mind courts and tribunals (like IOs in general) seek to create and maintain their legitimacy and independence when exercising their tasks. As Garret and Weingast put it, ‗[c]ourts whose rulings are consistently overturned typically find themselves and their role in the political system weakened. As a consequence, the actions of the courts are fundamentally ‗political' in that they must anticipate the possible reactions of other political actors in order to avoid their intervention. 30 It is to avoid these reputational costs and their possible consequences that courts and tribunals want their decisions and argumentative practices to -remain in the area of acceptable latitude.‖ 31 For institutions embedded within the effective functioning of a legal regime, such as international courts and tribunals, these perceptions of legitimacy may protect institutions ‗from abolishment or fundamental alterations of' their role as adjudicative bodies. 32 from within a particular international regime, 33 legitimacy is the shield with which an institution wielding neither the purse nor the sword might project and preserve its power.
By ‗legitimacy', I mean here a concept relating to the ‗justification and acceptance' of the authority exercised by arbitral tribunals by virtue of an international investment treaty between states. 34 More specifically, I am interested in the perceived legitimacy of the outcome of the authority exercised by arbitral tribunals. This perception is, it is argued, a contributing factor to the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration regime as a whole. 35 In other words, an actors' perception that adjudicative decision making, including interpretation and application, is conducive to its own preferences increases the likelihood that it regards the adjudicative body and that body's decisions as imbued with justified authority. 36 This legitimacy, in some degree, is one of the conditions for initial commitment and contintued consent to as well as compliance with-and hence the existence of-the regime as a whole. 37 Structurally, the concept of legitimacy in international investment law can be seen as a condition that might exist in three different, yet inter-related, co-dependant spheres. 38 The first is the governmental sphere, 39 the second is the civil society sphere, composed of NGOs and 33 As seen in the discussion of judicial review below. individuals, 40 and the third is the investors, usually multinational enterprises. 41 Each of these spheres represents diverging interests, values and approaches. 42 The connection in this respect between these three spheres is that they reflect (some of) the various strata that shape state interests toward a preference equilibrium at which point commitment might be a likely strategic outcome of intra-state interactions. 43 However, this preference-equilibrium can be altered by exogenous forces, such as the behaviour of the institution in question, or interpretation of a norm by an international adjudicator that is sufficiently at odds with what the actors initially had expected. 44 Or, as Grossman puts it, stressing the dynamic element, ‗perceptions of legitimacy may change over time' 45 e.g. when actors alter their views of the legitimacy of an international adjudicator after it has issued a particular decision, in particular if ‗a state consented in a treaty ratified many years before a concrete case arose' and the decision by the international adjudicator involves interpretation sufficiently at odds with initial state preferences. 46 Furthermore, because of the connection between the formation of state preferences and legitimacy as a condition in different spheres, sufficiently strong resentment against international norms and institutions in one sphere, e.g. civil society, cannot remain unaddressed to sufficiently large extent for a long time. If it is, the legitimacy, and hence the states' willingness to present behavior compliant with the regime, or even their willingness to 40 Governments may value sovereignty and consent above participation and transparency, whereas civil society may prefer the latter to the former. Consequently, ‗factors that may help to legitimize an institution in the eyes of non-state actors may help to delegitimize it in the eyes of state-actors.' Bodansky, supra n. 34, 314. 41 Note that this points to the reciprocal element of investment treaty arbitration. If the outcomes of arbitration under such treaties systematically went against the interests of foreign investors, presumably mainly capital exporting states would not be interested in providing consent to treaties that might also be employed against them. 42 ) 320-340. It is assumed that essentially the same game is played out (continously reiterated) with respect to decisions on continued commitment and compliance (though with the legislative branch being less significant because its most important role in this context is ratification) and (though less explicitly so) in principle also with respect to less conspicuous methods available for states to influence ex post the substance of their international legal commitments such as the generation of subsequent state practice in the respect of Article 31 (3) (a), (b) of the VCLT. On this method as a legitimacy enhancing measure, see generally Roberts, supra n.13. See also e.g. the 2005 US-Uruguay BIT, Annex E, ‗Within three years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.' Similarly, the three spheres I operate with are obviously not represented equally among all states. To the extent that they are not, a simplified assumption of arbitral tribunals navigating a binary of host state versus foreign investor interests should not necessitate altering the argument. 44 This is related to modes of interpretation. The ECtHR is often criticized for its ‗dynamic ' embedded actors within the system that constitutes the state, whereas States at any time might opt out of international regimes. 55 At any rate, I claim, in line with Ginsburg, that international judges (and arbitrators) too are strategic actors. 56 For international adjudicators without tenure-and international arbitrators, who are selected on an ad-hoc basis, in particular-these concerns about the opinions of the indirectly represented actors, the agents of which they are set to adjudicate against, 57 materialize along a different axis, yet they are no less important. Because they are appointed by the parties to the dispute, 58 usually one state and one investor, 59 arbitrators can afford to ignore the interests of neither.
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This multi-party consent to the investment treaty arbitration regime might be sustained through the appropriate application of legal techniques that contribute to its legitimacy. For adjudicators (and treaty-makers) this means that all the addressees, in a broad sense, of the regulation must be included. This is because a central determinant of the legitimacy of adjudicative decisions is fairness-related in the sense that should not be perceived to systematically favour one interest over another.
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One particularly salient feature of the investment treaty arbitration regime is that this legitimacy must be strengthened through mechanisms that take into account not only the interests of the state parties to the treaty and their various sub-branches in government and other preference shapers, but also the potential claimants, i.e. foreign investors, which, as noted above, therefore constrain adjudicative behaviour. If the foreign investors do not perceive the system to be legitimate, they are not likely to trust it. This might result in a decline in the (putative) efficiency of the investment treaty regime in terms of achieving the desired regime outcome, i.e. it might have a negative effect on the expected contribution to State party FDI. How can the interests of the involved parties be accommodated by the arbitral tribunal? The most notable example is the outcome of the cases. Put briefly, the outcome of a case is likely to be regarded as legitimate if the decision is made in an even-handed, fair and just manner as well as providing consequences not too much at odds with what is expected by the stakeholders. This being said, not only the outcome of the specific decisions but also tribunals' reasoning must be considered legitimacy-wise. Since international investment agreements mainly regulate the behavior of the state parties rather than the behavior of the investors-and since arbitral tribunals consequently are charged primarily with the task of reviewing the acts or omissions of a State-it is the manner in which arbitral tribunals consider such acts or inactions that can contribute to the legitimacy of the decisions they make. This is where proportionality analysis becomes relevant in the context of legitimacy and it is, as we shall see, in this context precisely it has been employed in investment treaty arbitration.
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II. Legitimacy concerns in investment treaty arbitration
In May 2007 Bolivia, as the first country ever, withdrew from the ICSID Convention.
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Venezuela has declared it will follow suit.
65 30 April 2008 it gave the Netherlands formal notice that it would terminate the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT. 66 There were probably several reasons for this action, including popular resentment and a domestic political situation in many countries in which opposition by some Latin American countries against the system of investment treaty arbitration similar to the one seen in the 1970s has flourished. 67 In addition 63 Sadurski and others have observed that when balancing between competing values judges are engaged in an activity very similar to lawmaking. This in itself could entail legitimacy critique in the sense that I have outlined here. As a consequence, proportionality analysis is best suited to review where the structure of the legal basis allows for a limitation of a right. Wojchieh Sadurski, -Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics‖in Sartor et al (eds.), supra n. 14, 129-146, 135, 138-140. I do not disagree with this, but as we shall see below, for the investment awards discussed in this paper -where the structure admittedly was rather different from the right-limitation model found in most international human rights and trade treaties and modern constitutions-alternative approaches had already faced much objection by scholars and others. 64 These events, as Asha Kaushal has noted, took place against the background of several investment treaty arbitration awards being rendered against Argentina and the measures it took in order to counter the economic crisis of 2000-02. 72 The crisis was caused by what is still a record high default on sovereign debt (totaling more than § 95 billion), 73 which forced the country to devalue and then float the peso, which had been pegged to the dollar. 74 As most savings, loans and contracts were in dollars, the devaluation added to the financial chaos. Many governmental functions, particularly in the utilities sector, had been privatized and were operated by foreign companies with contracts in dollars that were now devaluated. This led to a series of claims from foreign investors under bilateral investment treaties, customary international law and Argentine law and in many different legal forums. Here, we are concerned with those that might be regarded as part of the investment treaty arbitration regime. 75 In many of these cases, as we shall see, the very concept of ‗economic crisis' was of central importance. The legal questions centered inter alia on whether the ‗exceptional measures' taken by the Argentine government were justified because of the existence of a state of necessity, an emergency situation which might preclude, in one way or the other, 76 It is difficult to prove empirically, but I agree with Kaushal in that the outcome of these cases (many of which are still ongoing) contributed to a perceived lack of legitimacy of the regime, and that this was likely a key reason for these moves by States to exit it. 77 The cause of these events is not primarily an issue of insufficient compliance with either the ICSID Convention or the international investment treaties. Rather, it is the slightly different question of denunciation from such treaties. 78 A balancing approach by treaty tribunals might help mitigate this legitimacy deficit, but, as we shall see below, in their interpretative approaches tribunals should be careful to avoid stretching the underlying legal norms available to them.
Developed countries have had their own qualms with the regime. According to UNCTAD, at the end of 2008 the total number of BITs worldwide was 2.676, 79 a large majority of which has been signed after the 1990s. Regional investment treaties have followed suit, with the NAFTA and The European Energy Charter Treaty among the most renowned. An endeavor by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to create the more comprehensive Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) fell through in 1998, in part due to public protest and issues allegedly relating to national sovereignty and democracy.
80 Such negative public opinion-typically voiced by NGOs-has also faced BITs and the NAFTA. This has occurred in particular following awards where state regulations issued on the grounds of environmental concerns, labor rights and public health where found to be in breach of the treaty obligations of the state, but at the moment there seems to be a generally unfavorable opinion against investment treaties. 83 She argues additionally that revisions of the US Model BIT were made ‗to constrain the expansive interpretations of NAFTA tribunals, including the addition of noneconomic objectives such as ‗health, safety, environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights' to the preamble. 84 Most of these cases related to the distinction between a permissible regulation and indirect expropriations under either NAFTA or BITs. We shall see how tribunals also in this case finally turned to the principle of proportionality in order to counter such legitimacy related critique.
The next section, however, brings a closer examination of the application of the principle of proportionality as a defensive judicial strategy. 3. The legitimacy-enhancing function of the proportionality analysis in judicial review It has been argued that ‗some version of a proportionality test' is a general feature of rights adjudication worldwide.
86 At any rate, over the past fifty years or so proportionality analysis, as Stone Sweet and Matthews observe in a powerfully argued article, has become a widespread adjudicative technique for ‗managing disputes between rights involving an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest.'
87 Following a detailed analysis of the principle in the constitutional law jurisprudence of various jurisdictions, EU law, European human rights law and WTO law, the authors contend that when adjudicators turn to employ proportionality analysis this might generate processes that serves to ‗enhance, radically, the judiciary's role in both lawmaking and constitutional development'. 90 The advantage (and perhaps success) of proportionality analysis in this respect lies in its ability for adjudicators to mask their scrutiny as an inquiry into process rather than as a review of policy, 91 and to do so in precisely the types of decisions where the legal question is the ‗most in danger of being constructed in a partisan way.' 92 By ‗proportionality analysis' I mean here a model for judicial analysis consisting of three different elements: suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu, which must be assessed cumulatively. 93 The first of these implies ‗whether the measure at issue is suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective it pursues.' 94 For a measure to be suitable the existence of ‗a causal relationship between the measure and its object' is required. 95 For a measure to be necessary there must exist no alternative measure that is both less restrictive than the measure being reviewed and equally effective in achieving the objective pursued. 96 This stage of the analysis exists in a somewhat uneasy relationship with the notion of a wide margin of appreciation left to State parties by international adjudicators, 97 91 But it has not been without critics. Jacobs, for example, provides food for thought for a hypothetical skeptic, noting that ‗the application of the principle of proportionality in its more rigorous forms might be criticized on the ground that it goes beyond the judicial function. … It is not, the critic may say … the function of the courts to decide whether a particular exercise of power is the most appropriate way of achieving a particular policy goal.' Francis G. In the other award examined indepth here, this was not the case. However, the characterization of the relationship with proportionality and several standards of protection, each of which can be applicable in a specific case. Some of these might make the requirement for no less restrictive alternatives more explicit, such as prohibitions against arbitrary and discriminatory measures. Proportionality analysis sometimes seems to encompass this, and more rule of law-related scrutiny, as well.
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Finally, the measure must meet the requirement of proportionality stricto sensu, which ‗involves an assessment of whether the effects of a measure are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests involved.' 100 As Andenas and Zleptnig put it in a WTO context:
It is at this stage that a true weighing and balancing of competing objectives takes place. The more intense the restriction of a particular interest, the more important the justification for the countervailing objective needs to be.
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This final element comes into play after it has been established that measure in question has passed the suitability and necessity tests, and it is this stricto sensu phase that is used to scrutinze the government's level of protection. 102 Consequently, the application of this phase in the review can be regarded as the difference between hard and soft proportionality analysis.
I. The function of proportionality analysis in international judicial review
Proportionality analysis serves many purposes in judicial review.
103 Stone Sweet and Matthews argue that it has a dual role for judges:
1. to manage potentially explosive environments, given the politically sensitive nature of rights review. 2. to establish, and then reinforce, the salience of constitutional deliberation and adjudication within the greater political system. applicability. 106 In investment treaty arbitration, a corresponding role is conceivable, but so far proportionality has primarily been evoked as a State defense 107 rather than as a standard that can serve as -an instrument of rationalization‖ of State measures affecting foreign investors. 108 This is perhaps less testimony to a more developed proportionality analysis jurisprudence in the Court of Justice the European Union than in investment treaty arbitration as such than to the differences with respect to the legal and political environment in which the institutions have, so far, been exercising their duties.
Similarly, in the jurisprudence the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), arguably a court with less political clout than the Court of Justice of the European Union, 109 proportionality analysis can be regarded as the corollary to its lenient standard of review known as the ‗margin of appreciation' doctrine, which is crucial to the relation between proportionality analysis and legitimacy of international judicial review. In this sense, proportionality analysis might serve as a limit to ‗judicial self-restraint'. 110 It is in this vein, though perhaps reversing cause and effect, Julian Barnes has claimed that ‗as proportionality has been increasingly accepted as a criterion of judicial review, judiciaries have been creating various discretionary devices to soften its apparent impact', referring to ‗terms such as ‗margin of appreciation', ‗margin of discretion', ‗due deference', ‗variable intensity of review', ‗sliding scale of review'', 111 even noting that ‗discretion is treated as an inevitable component of proportionality review' and therefore ‗not a marginal phenomenon, but (...) potentially co-extensive with proportionality. ' 112 Though this doctrine of discretion has been criticized, 113 and because it by definition implies state-bias in litigation between States and individuals-arguably, it was developed as a tactical response to the system's ‗fragile foundations'- 114 proportionality analysis serves as the mitigating factor between the permissible and non-permissible outcomes of legitimate policies. 115 As we shall see below, investment treaty tribunals have, similarly, conducted proportionality analyses explicitly in connection with references to phrases similar to -margin of appreciation‖.
In this sense proportionality analysis serves as the nexus between the ECtHR's function both as a guarantor of individual rights and as a servant of its masters under international law, the States upon whose consent, compliance and commitment its existence is conditioned. In other words, the balancing test can be regarded as the most effective, yet non-intrusive and therefore least costly technique by which international, transnational and supranational adjudicative organs bodies might exercise some form of control over the affairs of sovereign States while taking into account the reciprocal nature of international agreements providing individuals with access to court. 116 Thus, there are ‗powerful strategic reasons' for adjudicators' adoption ‗of balancing posture; and they use techniques associated with balancing to mitigate certain strategic dilemmas.'
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In their article, Stone Sweet and Matthews argue that the attractiveness of proportionality analysis in modern, complex societies lies in its ability to mitigate problems for adjudicators in what they call a ‗2-against-1 situation'. Such situations arise in any third-party dispute resolution context in which the adjudicators are dependent upon the parties' perception of their neutrality vis-à-vis the parties. As international adjudicators are in many respects engaged in international lawmaking, 118 their choice among conflicting values also includes ‗favoring one policy interest over another.'
119 Balancing through proportionality analysis is then a preferable strategy to mitigate legitimacy attacks from either of the parties because it makes clear that:
(a) that each party is pleading a constitutionally-legitimate norm or value; (b) that, a priori, the court holds each of these interests in equally high esteem; (c) that determining which value shall prevail in any given case is not a mechanical exercise, but is a difficult judicial task involving complex policy considerations; and (d) that future cases pitting the same two legal interests against one another may well be decided differently, depending on the facts. 120 Notably, these factors do not seem to require the full-fledged three-step test outlined above, but at least the first of them appears to presuppose a suitability analysis. In investment treaty arbitration, this 2-against-1 problem is exacerbated, because the interests of one of the state parties to the investment treaty in question, the home state of the foreign investor instigating arbitration both has an interest in the concrete case (the well-being of a company of which it is a home state and through which it, too, wields power in international relations) and in the systemic outcome of the case, i.e. that it's own right to take similar measures against foreign investors covered by the same treaty at home are not unduly limited.
I. The function of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration
In my view, then, the function of the principle of proportionality in this context is best regarded as inducing legitimacy upon the political power and the decisions of institutions with little or no democratic legitimacy. This function can be explained by the fact that courts are limited by law and permissible legal reasoning. As Bodansky has argued, It is within these constraints proportionality analysis maximize adjudicative bodies' long-term powers in a subtle and non-intrusive manner by serving as the nexus between legal and social legitimacy. As such, it's attractivity is as easily understandable as its extraordinary diffusion. However, even if, as Stone Sweet and Mathews observe, proportionality analysis is ‗a doctrinal construction' which ‗emerged and then diffused as an unwritten, general principle of law through judicial recognition and choice', 122 this does not mean that courts and tribunals should feel free to employ the principle in any and all factual and legal contexts, 123 without taking due regard to factors such as the structure of the underlying legal instruments, the wording of the relevant provisions, and the rules and principles with which they are empowered to adjudicate. This is because investor-state arbitration, like any dispute settlement, is fundamentally ‗a rule driven process', meaning that, though it might seem like a trite observation, ‗[a]rbitrators have the duty to decide investor-state disputes according to the law.'
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When arbitrators perform proportionality analysis on a legally unsound basis, they are undermining its legitimacy-influencing aspects. As Grosman has put it, rulings and judgments lose their authority not only if they do not ‗accord with interests and values' but also if they are not ‗framed in the predominant legal discourse.' 125 In the following section, I argue that investment tribunals have not always been careful enough when performing proportionality analysis to earn the acclaim of the invisible college. Even though the following part brings a relatively detailed and critical analysis of two awards where the Tribunals conducted proportionality analyses, I do not in much detail scrutinize the specific usage of the 121 Daniel Bodansky ‗The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law' 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 596, at 605 122 Stone Sweet and Matthews, supra n. 15, 74. It is unclear whether this is intended to convey any doctrinal legal meaning in the sense of Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. For this approach, see e.g. Franck, supra n. 100, 716. At any rate, Stone Sweet and Matthews emphasize, like I do here, proportionality analysis -as an argumentation and balancing framework‖, or a -decision making procedure. Ibid, 75. 123 As they no doubt acknowledge. 124 Salacuse supra n. 26, 382. 125 Grosman supra n. 27, 143. proportionality principle in comparison with how other courts and tribunals have employed it. That inquiry will be dealt with elsewhere. Here, what I am concerned with is rather the legal foundations of the proportionality analyses that Tribunals have conducted.
The application of the proportionality principle in its 'new frontier'
I.
Proportionality analysis and the distinction between regulation and indirect expropriation
As noted above, legitimacy concerns in investment treaty arbitration has in particular been related to expropriation claims. Indeed, the taking of alien property by a state without compensation was long a hotly debated issue in international affairs. 126 The 1960s saw the first rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) by developed countries ‗as a way to protect their investments abroad against the growing risks of expropriation and nationalization.' 127 However, in recent years these -risks have greatly abated‖. 128 Today, the legality of expropriations of foreign property under international law is not contested.
129 In order to decide whether an expropriation is lawful under customary international law, an expropriation must be undertaken for a public purpose, not be discriminatory, in accordance with due process and, as mentioned, accompanied by compensation. 130 Most investment treaties contain this standard, though the details may wary somewhat. 131 The direct taking without compensation, on the other hand, has become unfashionable.
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In contemporary international investment law, what remains contested, like in many domestic law systems, is the line between the permissible, non-compensable regulation (affecting the property of foreign investors) and so-called indirect expropriation, which does not require a formal transfer of title of the investment. 133 The latter requires compensation to the foreign investor, the former not. However, if no compensation has been provided, this does of course not in itself entail that no expropriation has taken place but only whether, if there-legally speaking-was an expropriation, it was illegal. If it was illegal, the investor is entitled to damages, the sum of which can be very different from compensation. Therefore, the key 126 The literature is extensive, cf. for instance footnote 6 in the 9th edition of Oppenheim's. That footnote accompanies a sentence similar to the one this footnote accompanies and spans four pages. question is whether an expropriation has taken place. 134 If so, some form of indemnification is necessary.
Arbitral tribunals have grappled with this distinction between the permissible regulation and the indirect discrimination in several prominent cases, and it is perhaps testimony to the difficulties of the legal analysis that the jurisprudence is relatively fragmented. Three main approaches can be identified, 135 however, in which different criteria have been given different weight by different tribunals. The first of these is investor centered, the second is state centered while the third is a combination of the two. It is in this sense, as shown above with respect to the 2-against-1 situation, 136 that proportionality analysis was introduced in investment treaty arbitration, in a manner which-at least analytically-sought to take the interests of both the investor and the state into account. 1) According to the ‗sole effects' doctrine, 137 the only determinant to decide whether an indirect expropriation has taken place is the effect of the state measures upon the investment or investor. If the interference upon the investor's property rights is sufficiently grave and ‗not merely ephemeral', 138 an indirect expropriation has taken place. 139 2) Under the ‗radical police powers' approach, 140 an arbitral tribunal seeks to establish whether a measure taken by government affecting a foreign investor or its investment serves a legitimate purpose. If this can be established, the measure will not be regarded as an expropriation. However, tribunals do exercise some scrutiny. 141 This approach has been widely criticized in the literature. 3) The ‗moderate police powers' approach, 143 on the other hand, combines the two elements above, relying chiefly on the effect of the government measures upon the investor or investment, while also taking the purposes of the measure into account. However, early awards employing this doctrine did not set out in any detail the relationship between the criteria. 144 It was not until the 2003 Award in the Case of Tecmed v. Mexico that a tribunal sought to explain this relationship. The analytical tool the tribunal used in that case was the principle of proportionality, hitherto virtually unknown in investment treaty arbitration.
In that case, the claimant, a Spanish company, had acquired a hazardous industrial waste landfill in a Mexican public auction held in 1996 through its Mexican subsidiary, Cytrar. In 1994, Mexican environmental authorities (The National Ecology Institute, hereinafter referred to as ‗INE') gave authorization for the landfill to operate for an indefinite period of time.
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When the landfill was transferred to Cytrar, the company was authorized to operate the landfill until 19 November 1998, at which time such authorization could be extended every year at the applicant's request.
On 25 November 1998, however, INE rejected the application for renewal of the authorization, prompting Tecmed to seek damages in an investment tribunal under the BIT between Spain and Mexico. The Tribunal concluded that the primary motivation for the rejection of the authorization was ‗related to social or political circumstances'. 146 It rejected Mexico's grounds for the refusal as either baseless or that the issue had been remedied. Importantly, the Tribunal also found that there was no evidence that the site posed any danger to human health or the environment.
The main question with regard to the rejection of renewed authorization was whether, due to this rejection, the assets involved lost their value or economic use for Tecmed as well as the extent of the loss. 147 In the Tribunal's opinion, this distinction was important to distinguish between a regulatory measure, whereby the State exercised its legitimate police powers, and a de facto expropriation that deprived the assets and rights involved of any real substance. As indicated, however, the Tribunal considered it necessary to evaluate not only the effect but also the intent or characteristics of the rejection. 150 The proportionality test, as mentioned above, was employed as a neat methodological approach in order to help making the distinction mentioned earlier between a compensable indirect expropriation and a noncompensable regulation. As the Tribunal put it:
‗whether such actions or measures [were] proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality.' In itself this argument might have some merit. If one agrees that the duty to compensate follows from the principle of proportionality, and whereas, as mentioned above, compensation is a criterion for the lawful expropriation this might be analytically superior to the more radical approaches outlined earlier. But reframing the issue of the distinction between the illegal expropriation and the non-compensable regulation as one of proportionality, does not dissolve the question of whether one or the other has taken place.
In conclusion, the Tecmed Tribunal in this way used the proportionality test in order to determine whether an expropriation had occurred, whereas in the ECtHR jurisprudence it refers to it is used to decide whether expropriations that have occurred are justified. 162 The main difference lies in the structure of the different legal provisions: the expropriation clauses in applicable investment treaties and the property protection clause of the ECHR 163 respectively. As noted above, it is more fruitful to employ proportionality analysis when the structure of a legal instrument allows for limitation of a right, rather than the all-or-nothing approach taken to distinguish between the illegal expropriation and the permissible noncompensable regulation. Here, a 2-against-1 situation seems to be the only outcome even after proportionality analysis because there are only two possible results: either the investor wins and it will have to be compensated for an illegal act under international law, 164 or the State wins and owes the investor no compensation. Some recent Model BITs have, seemingly, tried to accommodate this, for instance by, literally, copying the text of the ECHR property protection clause into BITs. 165 Later tribunals, under similar BITs, have found this usage of the proportionality principle helpful in order to make the distinction between the indirect expropriation and the noncompensable regulation. 166 However, many tribunals have recently preferred to replace the finding of an indirect expropriation with establishing a violation of the fair and equitable treatment provisions often found in BITs, a standard which, in itself, is more flexible than the 161 It should be noted that in the pages referred to in Tecmed, Dinstein was merely referring to the expropriation jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Incidentally, he did so through a secondary source, P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer Law 3 rd ed 1998) 634, which, again, includes a discussion of the same cases the Tribunal in Tecmed pointed to in the first case. 162 Kriebaum, supra n. 134, 728. 163 Protocol 1, Article 1. It reads:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 164 See Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July 26). 165 The text of article 6(2) of the Norway Draft BIT is identical to the second paragraph of Article 1, Protocol 1, cf. supra n. 166. For an interesting analysis de lege ferenda on the usage of the proportionality principle in investment treaty arbitration based on the EctHR approach, see, see Kriebaum, supra n. 134, 729 et seq. 166 167 This path can therefore accommodate some of the same needs as proportionality analyses of expropriation claims. Some form of proportionality analysis might be applicable in this analysis too, however.
In the conclusion, I will present briefly how the Tribunal, in a very recent award in Total v. Argentina chose exactly this path, and I will argue that this approach includes hitherto the best use of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration.
II.
Proportionality analysis and the meaning of 'necessity' in investment treaties. The second field in which arbitral tribunals have employed proportionality analysis was, seemingly, no more founded in the text of the applicable treaty and in an area-issue that had become no less controversial. These decisions involved the necessity defense of Argentina under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 168 and customary international law. 169 All of these awards entailed scrutiny of measures taken by Argentina during the 2000-2001 financial crisis mentioned above and most have been controversial in one way or the other. The usage of proportionality analysis by the Tribunal in one of them, Continental Casualty, as we shall see, was no less so.
Art XI of the US-Argentina BIT reads: ‗This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.' Interestingly, with respect to Argentina's defense under this Article and under the customary international law standard of necessity, tribunals, evaluating essentially the same facts under the same legal norms concluded very differently and expressed differing views on the interpretation of art XI and the relationship between the two rules. 170 Art XI of the US-Argentina BIT reads: ‗This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.' Interestingly, with respect to Argentina's defense under this Article and under the customary international law standard of necessity, tribunals, evaluating essentially the same facts under the same legal norms decision that is bound to be undergo much scrutiny by legal scholars, the Sempra Annulment Committee annulled the original award on these grounds. 184 Here, however, the focus lies elsewhere.
Continental was a U.S. subsidiary of a leading provider of financial services, CNA Financial Inc. (CNA), headquartered in Chicago. Continental owned and controlled the Argentinaincorporated workers'compensation insurance provider, CNA Art. 185 This company, like other insurance companies, maintained an investment securities portfolio, which mainly consisted of various low-risk assets, including ‗cash-deposit, treasury bills and government bonds.' 186 Due to the measures referred to as ‗Argentina's Capital Control Regime' 187 enacted by the government in order to counter the economic crisis, Continental claimed that it had suffered an absolute loss in value of its assets exceeding $ 46.4 million. 188 These measures involved a temporary block of deposits, a prohibition on the transferring of funds abroad as well as of free currency exchange, a termination of the peso convertibility and pegging to the US dollar at a 1:1 exchange rate, 189 rescheduling of term deposits maturity dates and interest rates, and a forced conversion of outstanding dollar-denominated contracts and both public and private debt at a rate of 1.4:1(-pesification‖).
190
On the question whether these measures ‗were necessary in order to maintain public order and protect essential security interests of Argentina', the Tribunal departed from the other awards in a somewhat controversial manner. 191 It is this departure that demarks our point of interest here, as it included an in this context novel application of proportionality analysis, again with reference to extra-regime jurisprudence.
We should take note that the analysis was more sophisticated than in Tecmed. This was presumably due to the fact that the underlying legal norm analyzed in Continental Casualty, Art. XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, followed ‗the normative structure of ‗qualified rights '', 192 unlike the expropriation clause in the Mexico-Spain BIT applied in the Tecmed award. Art. XI was therefore more suitable for proportionality analysis.
than viewing the text of Art. XI contextually ‗from its limited understanding within the framework of the international obligations subsisting between the state parties to the BIT', 200 it interpreted it in the very different text, 201 structure context, object and purpose of Article XX of GATT, 202 a much broader exception clause. 203 With regard to that necessity test, it noted, ‗it is well established that:
[…] the reach of the word ‗necessary' is not limited to that which is ‗indispensable' or ‗of absolute necessity' or ‗inevitable.' Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfill the requirements of Article XX (d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX (d), the term ‗necessary' refers in our view to a range of degrees of necessity. At a one end of this continuum lies ‗necessary' understood as ‗indispensable;' at the other, is ‗necessary' taken to mean as ‗making a contribution to.' We consider that a ‗necessary' measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of ‗indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply ‗making a contribution to.' 204 Notably, this approach to the necessity test the Tribunal can be regarded as ‗distinctly regulatory-friendly' even in the context of GATT Art. XX. 205 objective‖ in order to be necessary was not a precise determination in the WTO Appellate Body decision it cited (Brazil-Tyres). Rather, it was a phrase used by the AB to distinguish the necessity threshold of Article XX from Brazil's claim that a measure that provided only a marginal or insignificant contribution to its stated objective could be considered necessary. Arguably, all of this is very far from the narrow necessity test in Art XI of the BIT.
The Tribunal then formulated a two-step analysis in applying the other test about whether Argentina had reasonably available alternatives that would have been 1) not in breach of the BIT, that might have been available when the Measures challenged were taken and that would have yielded equivalent results/relief and 2)'whether Argentina could have adopted at some earlier time different policies, that would have avoided or prevented the situation that brought about the adoption of the measures challenged.' [para 198.] This two-step analysis resulted in a powerful conclusion in favor of Argentina. In all but one of the measures enacted by the Government, 216 the Tribunal held that its conduct in the face of the crisis ‗conformed by and large with the conditions required from derogating from its obligations under Art. XI of the BIT'. 217 While it is not my intention here to reassess the necessity-determination of these complex regulatory measures, it seems that the earlier formulation of the test certainly determined the result. For instance, to the extent that one follows the Korea-Beef description of different degrees of necessity, 218 it seems difficult to agree with the Tribunal that the one of the several complex mechanisms taken by Argentina that affected investors which it described as -appropriate and reasonable‖ (related to -pesification‖ and subsequent freezing of dollar-denominated term-deposits) could be said to fall within any reasonable reading of Article XI.
Most importantly for our purposes: in this case, too, what may have well been a desirable outcome was reached through an exercise of proportionality analysis that rested on a somewhat less than solid basis.
Conclusion. I. The Total Approach
In the very recent award in Total v. Argentina, an Arbitral Tribunal had the chance to examine the events in Argentina during the 2001-02 economic crisis yet gain. While the legal questions in that case were, essentially, the same as in Continental Casualty above (though under the France-Argentina BIT), the approach was notably different and decidedly more logical. Firstly, the Tribunal examined specific breaches under the BIT and then it examined whether the necessity defense was available. In conducting the necessity analysis, the Tribunal did not, like in Continental Casualty, employ proportionality analysis but chose rather to follow the more common, and much narrower, approach found in Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on 216 See para. 221 et seq. The reason for this difference, which concerned an offer to swap Treasury Bills against newly issued securities, was inter alia the late date in which it was offered, at which point Argentina's financial conditions could no longer be described as a crisis, with a specific reference to Art. 25 (1) (i) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (‗the only way for a State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril'). Continental was awarded $2.8 million out of a $ 112 million claim. The specific breach was of the Fair and Equitable Treatment protection in Art. II(2)(a) of the BIT, see para. 266. 217 Para. 233 . 218 See text accompanying note 202 above.
for arbitrators to help allay it is to avoid straying outside the confines of solid and persuasive legal reasoning and methodology.
